Tuesday, April 29, 2025

How Does a Changing World Order Change Ethiopia?

 (Befekadu Hailu) 


Historically, significant shifts in the global order have also profoundly impacted Ethiopia’s internal order. In the early 20th century, one of the key factors contributing to Ras Teferi Mekonnen's (later Haile Selassie I) rise over Lij Iyasu was his alignment during the First World War. Lij Iyasu, as the grandson of Menelik II, was entitled to inherit the throne upon the emperor's death in 1913. However, while he was trying to make local and international alignments, he chose to be aligned with the Ottoman Empire, Germany, and Austria-Hungary (the Central Powers); in contrast, Ras Tafari, the great-grandson of Sahle Silassie, the grandfather of Menelik II, aligned with Great Britain, the Russia Empire, and France (the Allied Powers). 


Lij Iyasu's perceived conversion to Islam and his connections with the Ottoman Empire and Somali nationalist leader Mohammed Abdullah Hassan, who resisted British and Italian colonialism, had concerned the Allied powers. They feared that his alliances could destabilize their colonies in the Horn of Africa and give the Central Powers a strategic advantage.  Conversely, Ras Tafari’s strategic loyalty to the Allied Forces earned him the support of Britain and France, who viewed him as a counter to Lij Iyasu's pro-Central Powers stance. They facilitated his rise by providing troops and using him as a mediator. In September 1916, the Allied powers, particularly Britain and France, actively supported the coup d'état that deposed Lij Iyasu. 


Ras Tafari then slowly but surely dismantled the decentralized power structure and created a centralized army and bureaucracy in his long years in power. Had Lij Iyasu won the power struggle, it is believed he would have promoted a multi-religious and decentralized political settlement. 


During World War II, Emperor Haile Selassie allied himself with the Allied Forces, which included the United Kingdom, United States, and USSR, against the Axis Powers, which included Fascist Italy, Nazi Germany, and Imperial Japan. Italy had invaded Ethiopia, forcing the Emperor into political exile. This alliance proved beneficial for the Emperor, as he regained power in 1941 with the support of the United Kingdom's military. This alliance further aided Haile Selassie; the Allied Powers submitted a report to the United Nations, stating that Eritrea lacked national consciousness and the economic means to sustain independence. Additionally, the US lobbied in favor of Ethiopia, and the UN endorsed the federation of Eritrea with Ethiopia. 


The fall of Ethiopia’s Imperial system and the rise of a socialist regime were not isolated incidents. Instead, while domestic factors dictate changes, it was also heavily influenced by the changing world order. The decades after the Second World War were characterized by decolonization. The growing awareness among Ethiopians, particularly scholars and intellectuals, regarding anti-colonial struggles across Africa and the Global South fostered a heightened consciousness concerning Ethiopia's internal hierarchical power dynamics and economically exploitative systems. This exposure to Marxist, anti-colonial, and anti-imperialist discourse provided a framework for critical analysis, leading some intellectuals to conceptualize the southern and peripheral regions of Ethiopia as being in a relationship akin to internal colonialism. This perspective effectively challenged the legitimacy of the unitary and often idealized narrative of Imperial Ethiopia, thereby amplifying dissenting voices and contributing to the socio-political environment that ultimately facilitated the rise of a socialist regime in the 1974 revolution.


Similar to its rise, the fall of the Derg regime was also influenced by the changing global order. The Derg's primary patron, the Soviet Union (USSR), indeed experienced a decline in global influence culminating in its dissolution in 1991, marking the end of the Cold War. Simultaneously, armed groups opposing the Ethiopian central government, such as the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF), astutely observed the shifting international political landscape and strategically adopted the language of Western-style liberal democracy. As a result, the armed groups seized power and redefined the country's social contract, while Eritrea seceded. 


As I have briefly demonstrated above, although Ethiopian political actors have the agency and domestic political dynamics play their own roles, the global political landscape significantly influences regime changes, redefines political relationships, and the dominance of political actors.  Internal political changes in Ethiopia are therefore likely to occur as a result of shifts in the global order. The nature of these internal changes will depend on the actions and alignment of political actors in response to the evolving international situation.


How is the Global Order Changing?


The global landscape is undeniably in flux, with compelling arguments for a changing world order fueled by the rise of powers like China and India, a perceived decline in US hegemony, challenges to the liberal international order, increasing geopolitical tensions, the growing influence of non-state actors, technological disruptions, and the assertive voice of the Global South. 


The unipolar order led by the United States’ liberal democracy is now crumbling from the inside out. Trump’s administration decision to dismantle the US’s soft power, such as the USAID, and its trade war with the world, and most particularly with China, is speeding up the change into either a uni-multipolar order (a global system where there is one superpower with competing regional powers) or multipolar order (where multiple super powers competing each other) or one after the other. 


The United States remains the wealthiest country, boasting a vast military might; therefore, it is likely to maintain its global hegemony for some time to come. However, China’s unparalleled and ongoing economic and technological advancements will inevitably undermine American economic dominance. Additionally, the emergence of new regional powers in the Middle East will create a possibility of a multipolar order.

Currently emerging global order is characterized by a complex multipolarity, primarily structured by a developing Sino-American bipolarity. The evolving international system is characterized by strategic competition and the formation of diverse alliances within a multipolar landscape. A US-led pole, encompassing traditional allies like the NATO-dependent European Union and “neoliberal states,” often frames its actions as a contest between democracies and autocracies. This pole is counterbalanced by a China-led pole, strengthened by a strategic alliance with Russia, and underpinned by economic initiatives such as the Belt and Road Initiative, as well as structures like the Eurasian Economic Union and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Adding to the complexity are dynamic emerging blocs, such as BRICS, pivotal balancing powers like India, and a potential unified Muslim countries (Middle East) pole.


Worrisomely, most changes in global order are preceded by massive military conflicts. Historically, it is often the fall of one hegemonic force that leads to the rise of another. 


In the context of Sino-American bipolarity, although tensions exist, there is no consensus among international relations scholars on the likelihood of a third world war. Although the risk of great power conflict has arguably increased, mutually assured destruction, economic interdependence, and the potential for catastrophic consequences continue to act as significant deterrents. The current global landscape is more accurately characterized by intense strategic competition and the potential for regional conflicts rather than an inevitable slide into a worldwide conflagration. More prominently, proxy wars will be more instrumentalized. 


After the end of the Cold War, as many countries have nuclear weapons, interstate wars have declined. Instead, the manipulation and sustenance of intrastate wars, such as civil wars, have become a trend for the advancement of regional or international interests. The war in Ukraine, the war in Gaza, and the war in Sudan serve as contemporary examples where external actors significantly influence and support warring factions, often for their own geopolitical or strategic advantage. 


Additionally, the proliferation and increasing influence of non-state armed groups receiving international support are significant features of the evolving security landscape. Non-state armed groups can serve as proxies to expand the impact of state actors, thereby avoiding direct military conflict between major powers. Examples of this include the Wagner Group's activities in Africa and Ukraine, the Houthis' involvement in the Yemeni Civil War, and Hezbollah's role in Lebanese and regional politics. These groups often receive external backing and support, enabling them to act on behalf of state actors while maintaining a degree of separation.


What is Better for Ethiopia?


Ethiopia currently maintains a delicate balancing act between Eastern and Western superpowers. It enjoys robust economic ties with China and holds BRICS membership, while simultaneously being a major recipient of Western aid. Regionally, Ethiopia's relationships are shaped by water politics, particularly the sharing of the Nile River, which has caused friction with downstream nations such as Egypt and Sudan. Its quest for sovereign access to the Red Sea has created tensions with neighboring Somalia and Eritrea. The other major issue of foreign affairs for Ethiopia is economic integration and security


Internally, non-state armed groups have proliferated, especially in the states of Oromia and Amhara. These groups have diverse goals, ranging from removing the current government to dissolving the Ethiopian state altogether. The government frequently claims that these groups receive foreign backing, although these accusations lack independent confirmation. Nevertheless, the danger of foreign adversaries supporting these armed groups to destabilize the central government is significant. There is also the Tigray situation, which remains largely unresolved. The structure of Ethiopia's federalism, intergovernmental relations, and even the form of government are highly contested. As global and regional political dynamics shift, Ethiopia's future will depend on the alignment of domestic political actors and the government's domestic and foreign policies.


The US-led bloc promotes democratic values and civic virtues, at least in theory. Conversely, the China-led bloc emphasizes equitable development, and its model of fast economic growth is envied by developing nations. While US interventionist policies have resulted in coups and civil wars globally, China has, thus far, maintained a strictly non-interventionist military policy. However, it uses its economic leverage to influence others. Regardless, history has shown that dominant nations impose their political ideologies on the rest of the world, and countries allied with the winning side reap the benefits, while those that choose the losing side risk being dismantled, as exemplified by the Ottoman Empire and the USSR. 


Consequently, the repercussions of choosing an alignment are severe. Sadly, the options seem limited, and it would be best if Ethiopians and developing countries could make a better choice than aligning with one of the power-polarized blocs. Above all, developing countries like Ethiopia should not have to choose between a better political ideology and a better economic development model; instead, they should find avenues that enable them to achieve both. The trend in the changing world order might shift from a unipolar to a unimultipolar and then multipolar world order.


A multipolar world, where power is distributed among several major players instead of being concentrated in just one or two, has both potential advantages and disadvantages. On the plus side, it could mean more freedom for smaller countries, diverse partnerships, better economic opportunities, and respect for different cultures. It may encourage countries to collaborate more closely. However, it could also lead to increased instability, competition, and even conflict as these major players vie for influence, making it more challenging to solve global problems and potentially weakening international organizations.

Ethiopia must pursue strategic choices rooted in economic sovereignty and political agency. This entails diversifying partnerships beyond traditional power centers and structures, engaging proactively in South-South cooperation, and advocating for more equitable international systems. Economic resilience can be built through diversified value chains, domestic resource mobilization, and technological leapfrogging in areas like digital finance. These efforts should be complemented by a robust internal agenda that strengthens governance through the rule of law, respect for human rights, and inclusive political participation, ensuring accountable governance and development that is both equitable and sustainable.

Equally critical is resolving domestic political issues and deepening regional integration. Regionally, it is crucial to mutually invest in shared infrastructure, harmonized regulations, and joint security initiatives, which can foster economic harmony, reduce dependency, and help break the cycles of violence. Ethiopia must not wait for a more just order to emerge. It must help build it by leveraging the African Union, Nile Basin negotiation platforms, IGAD, and other partnerships with its neighbors.

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