Irreechaa 2016

(Befekadu Z. Hailu)

[Today marks the 10th Anniversary of Irreechaa 2016, a turning point for the then-Oromo protests. In my book, "Lost in Transition: Deceit and Conflict in Ethiopia (2014 - 2022)," I dedicated a chapter to its history, its tragic turnout, and the claims and counterclaims that followed. Read the chapter herebelow.]

----

Ireechaa is an annual festival celebrated as part of the rituals of Waaqeffannaa, an indigenous faith system of the Oromo people. The festival marks the end of the rainy season and the beginning of the harvesting season, symbolizing the flourishing of new life and fertility. Ireechaa is a moment of gratitude to Waaqa (Sky/God) for the blessings and mercies he has provided throughout the year. While primarily a religious festival, Irreechaa has evolved to encompass cultural and political dimensions, reflecting the Oromo people's history, identity, and aspirations. Most Oromo people are followers of Islam and Christianity; however, this festival brings together millions of people from diverse backgrounds, making it a popular cultural and political event in Ethiopia.^[1]

Irreechaa became a platform to channel grievances, criticisms, and resistance against state repression and lack of freedom. Irreechaa 2016, which took place on October 2, 2016, exemplified how the festival is as much a political platform as a cultural and religious event.

“Down, Down, Woyane!”

In 2016, Haile-Mariam Desalegn was Ethiopia's Prime Minister and the chairperson of the ruling coalition EPRDF; however, many in opposition considered him a “puppet” of the TPLF.^[2] Later, in an article published on Foreign Policy, he admitted that the Tigray People’s Liberation Front dominated the Coalition, while arguing that there was no moral equivalence between the TPLF and the new federal administrators. He said, “I confess, a TPLF-dominated coalition ruled Ethiopia shrewdly for 27 years.”^[3] The number of years cited includes his rule, which lasted for six years. It is with this conviction that the Oromo Protests targeted the TPLF (also known as Woyane) rather than the larger coalition, the EPRDF, or Oromia’s ruling party, OPDO, in particular. Haile-Mariam belonged to the Wolayita ethnic minority group from SNNPR. He chaired the Southern Ethiopia Peoples’ Democratic Movement (SEPDM) and the EPRDF.

The 2016 festival, which took place in Bishoftu, a town just east of Addis Ababa, coincided with heightened protests. Anticipating demonstrations, the government deployed a substantial security force, including masked riot police and snipers, to patrol the festival grounds alongside attendees who had travelled from across Oromia. Despite the tension, the atmosphere remained vibrant and colorful.

In his book published in 2025, Jawar wrote that “the government, suspecting that Irreechaa could turn into a protest, prepared to control and thwart it. Qeerroo, meanwhile, continued to prepare to stage a spectacle that would be heard worldwide, turning the festival into a protest march.”^[4]

While the festival was underway, the people at the venue began booing the government and raising their arms in an X formation, a popular symbol of the Oromo Protests, against those who went on stage to deliver speeches. Previously, the Abba Gadaas (chosen leaders from various Oromo clans) were assigned to speak in accordance with Gadaa tradition, along with authorities who often interjected political propaganda into their speeches. In this year’s festival, however, in response to public disapproval of authorities, only Abba Gaddaas were expected to speak. However, the Qeerroo furthered the demand by asserting that only Abba Gadaa Senbeto should take the stage, as he was perceived to be unaffiliated with the government.

Abba Gadaa Senbeto was the then-chair of the Abba Gadaa Council of Oromia. A month before the festival, it was reported that the Council had submitted an appeal to the Prime Minister's Office, raising the people's concern.^[5] At the same time, Senbeto also told reporters that the Council decided that government officials and federal forces should avoid the Hora Arsade (Lake Arsade), where the festival's central ritual is held.

In the middle of the controversy over who makes the speech, a young man named Gemeda Wario suddenly jumped onto the stage, seized the microphone from a man trying to calm down the angry protesters, and chanted the catchy phrase: “Down, Down, Woyane!”^[6],[7]

Woyane is a term used to refer to the TPLF; it means “revolutionary” in Tigrayan literary and is the term used in place of “front” in the Tigrinya name of the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (Hizbawi Woyane Harinet Tigray). This was perhaps one of the most spectacular defiance the Front had ever faced in more than two decades of its dominance of the Coalition and the state. This chant would later lead one of the distinguished Ethiopian experts, René Lefort, to conclude that the Qeerroo and the Fanno didn’t ask for freedom or democracy, but the stepping down of the TPLF.^[8]

Immediately after Gemeda led the chants, a tragedy unfolded. Addis Standard, in a Special Edition In Memory of the Fallen, told the account of what happened. “As protests intensified and chaos erupted near the stage where the main ceremony was scheduled to take place, security forces began firing tear gas and warning shots to disperse the protesters.”^[9]

What followed was a tragedy. Addis Standard’s reporter, who attended the festival, said, “I saw people who had fallen into ditches and deeper pits. I saw people who had no one to pick them up. I saw people suffocated by the smoke from the tear gas.”

Stampede or Massacre?

“Over 500 people confirmed killed at #IrrechaMassacre” - Jawar Mohammed^[10]

“No sound of gun was heard” - Prime Minister Haile-Mariam Desalegn^[11]

The Irreechaa 2016 protest was a pivotal moment that signaled the beginning of the end of the EPRDF regime and had a lasting impact on Ethiopian politics. It introduced the potent protest chant “down, down, [opposed group’s name]”, which has since become a staple in demonstrations in the country and among the Ethiopian diaspora. Moreover, the Irreechaa incident ushered in a new era of polemical political discourse characterized by exaggerated claims and counterclaims, as well as the mobilization of public sentiment and its denial, all without regard for concrete evidence.

The Oromo Federalist Congress (OFC), an opposition group, said more than 678 people were killed, while the government of Ethiopia reduced the number to 55.^[12] The number of casualties was not the only disputed fact; the cause of death was also contested. The opposition called it a “planned and orchestrated massacre” while the government called it a “stampede caused by troublemakers”.

The government rejected all allegations of involvement by security forces. The Prime Minister appeared on national television on the day of the event and said that “only evil actors” were involved in the “destruction” of that day. He added, “Our security forces have demonstrated a high discipline to protect the safety [of the gathering]” and “no sound of gun was heard”. Thus, on behalf of the government of Ethiopia, he extended “gratitude to the security forces for their hard efforts to protect the people.”

Habtamu Dugo, a journalist and professor based in Washington, DC, and Joanne Eisen, a Senior Fellow for Criminal Justice and Genocide at Independence Institute, Denver, Colorado, alleged hyperbolically, in a joint statement, that “it was not a stampede; it was a planned part of an ongoing genocide, why refuse to call it by its real name?”^[13] Similarly, the renowned Oromo scholar Asafa Jalata from the University of Tennessee boldly concluded, “[t]he Tigrayan-led Ethiopian regime massacred more than seven hundred Oromos and injured hundreds more at Irreechaa” and called for other ethnic groups to join the Oromo Protests to remove what he called “Tigray-led terrorist and genocidal regime.”^[14]

Getachew Reda, the communications minister, called the protestors “troublemakers” and added that none of the deceased “have any bullet wounds whatsoever.” He asserted, “They were killed in the stampede. The security forces were mostly unarmed, and none of them were involved in firing at the people.” He also alleged that “there was no force involved” because the event was a people’s event. Diaspora elements “take advantage to promote a political agenda.”^[15] Getachew Reda would later retreat to Mekelle with TPLF, be the most outspoken member of the Front during the war, and would be appointed an interim president of Tigray after the peace deal that ended the war, and finally retreat to Addis Ababa to be appointed advisor to the prime minister, who was brought up by the protests he worked against. 

On October 3, Fana Broadcasting Corporate, a ruling party-affiliated media, quoted Dr. Desalegn Bayisa, the head of Bishoftu Hospital, as saying, “We didn’t get anyone from the injured or dead bodies who was wounded by gunfire or other weapons. The main causes of death are stampede and suffocation.”^[16]

Regardless, Habtamu and Eisen alleged “reporters with close ties to the TPLF regime of Ethiopia, such as Bloomberg News’ William Davison and Reuters’ reporter and TPLF-sympathizer and undercover propagandist Aaron Maasho, and others at BBC and CNN, ran with disturbing headlines that squarely mispresented the cause for the intentional massacre of hundreds and injuries of thousands of Oromo as a stampede.” They also discredited Dr. Desalegn Bayisa's statements.

None of the international media correspondents who attended the festival confirmed the use of live ammunition against protestors. However, Addis Standard quoted eyewitnesses who saw police firing live ammunition into the sky to disperse protestors. The Amharic Ethiopian Reporter, a local newspaper, reported that:

Due to protests at the festival, riot police of the region fired tear gas at the people, and many people who tried to escape the smoke fell off a cliff and died. Although the exact number of people who lost their lives is not known, eyewitnesses have stated that the toll may be close to a hundred.^[17]

Based on unattributed reports from social media and bloggers, Habtamu and Eisen added:

The fact that government managed to ship bodies of hundreds killed with bullets to Addis Ababa, just within 25 miles from Bishoftu where the massacre took place, shows us that the regime preplanned both the massacre as well as methods of denying that it happened even when people saw it unfold.

A concerted smear campaign began shortly after. An article titled "The Evil Ghost of Jawar" was published in many ruling party-affiliated media outlets. The article alleged that the opposition disseminated this kind of false information because they are paid per number of casualties: “The likes of Jawar, who are paid [by Eritrean and Egyptian governments] based on the number of people who have died, have stretched the number of casualties to 500.”^[18],[19]

After observing this absurd battle of disinformation, Paul Schemm, a longtime correspondent for The Washington Post in Ethiopia, published an article titled "In Ethiopia’s war against social media, the truth is the main casualty." His article tells of the Ethiopian government’s headache at the time: social media. Haile-Mariam Desalegn addressed the U.N. General Assembly a week before Irreechaa. Haile-Mariam said, “We are seeing how misinformation could easily go viral via social media and mislead many people, especially the youth.” He added, “Social media has certainly empowered populists and other extremists to exploit people's genuine concerns and spread their message of hate and bigotry without any inhibition.”^[20]

“In a strange twist,” wrote Schemm, “the government, which often interferes with foreign journalists attempting to report across the country, ended up citing Western media reports that none of the victims exhibited gunshot wounds to bolster their version of events.”

Whether it was a massacre or a stampede, while the opposition spent their energy and time contesting the numbers and causes, the government used the opportunity to discredit them, using it as a showcase of how false narratives emerge and proliferate on social media.

HRW, in its report “Fuel on the Fire”, urged an investigation by an international body and called for the prevention of security intervention ahead of Irreechaa 2017.^[21]

Ezekiel Gebissa, a professor of history and African studies at Kettering University, wrote to Addis Standard that “the government has two options” after the Irreechaa 2016 went tragically. He said the first is the exit option, the relatively honorable and less costly choice that can be made now. The other is staying the course and continuing to cause murder and mayhem. That is the worst option for the government and its officials.”^[22]

Meanwhile, the opposition called for more resistance, while the government declared national days of mourning.

Days of Rage and Mourning

Before Irreechaa 2016, Oromo Protests were mainly peaceful. Only the police used force to disperse the protestors. This soon changed when Jawar announced “Five Days of Rage,” starting on October 3, 2016.^[23] On the same day, the Ethiopian government declared a three-day national mourning period. Accordingly, flags across the country, as well as Ethiopian embassies and consular offices, were lowered to half-mast, and radio and television stations played only mourning classical music.^[24] The country, filled with sorrow, kept a wary eye on the situation.

In his aforementioned book, Alitsetsetim (No Regrets), Jawar recalled that the decision to declare the five days of rage was made collectively by a team of the movement’s leaders. Whether it was made individually or by a team, it was a call for mob violence. He wrote, “Qeerroo had identified those institutions that grabbed public land without compensation, that released toxic waste that contaminated water and soil, and so on, to become targets of the attack.”

The following days were full of violence. In three days, protestors damaged at least a dozen mostly foreign-owned factories and flower farms, as well as vehicles.^[25] Jawar himself boosted the success of the violence by posting pictures of burnt trucks. On October 8, he even reported statistics of property damage and human casualties:

In the last six days of rage, at least 500 trucks, buses, and cars owned by the government, TPLF/EFFORT, Al Amoudi & foreign companies that stole farmers' land have been damaged or destroyed. Three drivers who attempted to drive through a large crowd of protesters were killed, while the rest of the drivers were let go and given safe passage.^[26]

Jawar also shared a news report about the destruction and looting of properties and vowed that “There is more severe destruction coming your way as long as you keep killing our people and looting resources from our homeland.”^[27]

This decision, Jawar admitted in the book, raised many concerns. He claimed that even the U.S. authorities requested an explanation from him. He wrote, the Americans “reprimanded me, but I argued, citing books on the subject, that destroying property is an acceptable means of peaceful protest as long as it does not harm human life or body. They were convinced and passed me with warnings.” Then, he added, the number of people who usually gathered at OMN’s studio dramatically decreased because they thought the Americans would arrest me. It was then that Jawar became an untouchable figure.

At this time, the government had turned off mobile data, which most Internet users use to access social media. Yet, the worst was coming.

The State of Crackdown

The EPRDF government declared a State of Emergency (SoE) on October 9, 2016, to quell the widespread protests. The SoE 2016 was so forceful that it successfully suppressed the protests, albeit for a few weeks.

The directive, issued to enforce the SoE, authorized strict control over information and communication channels to suppress dissent and maintain government control. As HRW observed, the directive restricted multiple rights. A longer quote is to demonstrate the extent of its impact. It:

Criminalized free expression by broadly prohibiting any online or media content that the government deems could cause “misunderstanding” or “unrest.”

Restricted access to independent media by blocking access to diaspora media outlets like ESAT and OMN, labeling them as "terrorist media," thus limiting alternative sources of information.

Enabled censorship by granting the executive body the power to "censor and block" radio and television broadcasts, further consolidating its control over the flow of information.

Silenced political opposition by preventing political parties from engaging with local or foreign media if their communication is deemed potentially disruptive to the government's authority.^[28]

In essence, this directive severely curtailed freedom of expression, media freedom, and the ability of political parties, nonprofit organizations, and advocacy groups to communicate with the public, creating an environment conducive to authoritarian control and the suppression of dissent. Additionally, freedom of assembly, peaceful protest, and the right to due process of law were restricted.

The SOE also established a command post for security structures responsible for ensuring peace and stability. This, in effect, temporarily placed the federal security forces above the civilian administration nationwide.

Arbitrary Mass Detentions

Arbitrary mass arrests were a common tactic during the SoE, targeting opposition members and officials, journalists, bloggers, human rights defenders, students, and teachers. Many of the arrests took place after the SoE’s declaration, but some individuals were detained beforehand, and their cases were later transferred to the command post’s purview. According to government officials, 11,607 individuals were arrested during the first two weeks of the SoE, which lasted for ten months. Opposition figures contest that the number might be as high as 29,000.^[29]

In a report documenting the ten months under the SoE, the EHRP detailed horrifying testimonies of victims who were arbitrarily detained, held incommunicado, and even sent to military camps for interrogation, torture, and indoctrination.^[30]

One individual, arrested on September 30, 2016, for his social media activism, was released on October 20, 2016, due to lack of evidence, but was immediately re-arrested and transferred to the command post for allegedly violating the SOE, despite being in detention when it was passed. Arrests were often carried out by ununiformed intelligence and police officers without warrants or identification, a practice addressed by a revised directive on November 8, 2016. Many detainees were not brought to court, and some were re-arrested even after being granted bail. For example, a Blue Party member, Blen Mesfin, was arrested on October 11, 2016, released on November 4 on a 10,000 Birr bail, and immediately re-arrested by ununiformed officers.

Those targeted in the mass arrests included young people from areas with uprisings, suspected protesters, university students and lecturers critical of the government, and students suspected of coordinating protests. Detainees were held in police stations and makeshift prisons, often lacking basic necessities such as food, water, and sanitation facilities.

Detainees often shared the limited food their families brought.  Those transferred to other police stations were labeled “command post prisoners,” “trustee prisoners,” or “temporary,” and treated differently from regular prisoners. Some detainees were transferred across regions. One individual, a member of the Unity for Democracy and Justice party, was arrested in Gondar, transferred to Bado Shidisht (zero-six), a prison in West Tigray, with other members, and allegedly tortured before being released after lobbying by Addis Ababa members of his party. Many detainees were forced to undergo “reformation” or “renewal” training, intended to brainwash them with pro-government ideals. Even after the indoctrination, some were released on bail after counseling, while others were charged, but all faced uncertainty about their future.

Indoctrination to “Never Again”

EHRP’s report details the experiences of different people who were taken to military camps from Oromia, Amhara, and Addis Ababa. However, while these prisoners were transferred to military camps, the government offered no information to detainees about where and why they were being transferred, creating immense anxiety. Prisoners were frequently moved at night to unknown locations, sparking fears of execution.

One detainee, arrested at Bole sub-city police station and transferred on November 17, 2016, along with 200 others, described the terrifying situation, with even the police escorts unaware of their destination. Detainees from various police stations were transported in five cars crossing Adama city, and upon reaching Awash, the buses circled in the dark, heightening fears. As the prisoners would learn later, they were transported to military camps, which turned into indoctrination training centers for the month.

These "reformation" or “indoctrination” training centers were located at Tolay, Bir Sheleko, Awash 7 kilo, and Alage military training camps. Upon arrival, detainees were forced to discard their shoes, and men had their heads shaved.  Sanitation was severely lacking, with no toilets and limited hygiene supplies.

While Addis Ababa experienced no protests beyond the August 6, 2016, Grand Oromo Protests, detainees from the city were still sent to these camps.  In the first round, 242 Addis Ababa detainees were sent to Awash 7 from November 17 to December 20, 2016 (33 days), and in the second round, 236 were sent to Tolay from December 20, 2016, to February 3, 2017 (45 days). Addis Ababa detainees often spent one to two months in temporary detention, where they learned about and sometimes defended themselves against their charges. Detainees from other areas were quickly transferred to the military camps, where they faced brutal interrogations. One detainee at Awash 7 described joining over 1,000 others from different localities who had endured harsh treatment.^[31]

The “reformation” training consisted of six modules, initially delivered by police and military personnel, but later managed through group discussions that included anonymous feedback. The modules covered topics such as economic growth, western-sponsored “color revolutions,” interpretations of the Ethiopian history, constitutional democracy, the national renaissance, and the role of youth. Conditions in the camps were harsh, with limited food and a very hot environment in training sites, causing many to faint.  Upon release, everyone was forced to wear white T-shirts with the phrase “Never Again” written in Amharic, Afaan Oromoo, and English, as though they had committed a crime, been pardoned by the government, and released with promises.^[32]

Released detainees often faced difficulties reintegrating into their lives, struggling with job reinstatement and financial hardship. One teacher, arrested for speaking out, quit his job after the training and joined the Blue Party, choosing to fight institutionally rather than face further individual repercussions.

The SoE was effective for some time. It quelled many of the protests in Oromia and Amhara, albeit temporarily. However, another challenge was emerging from within the regime.

-----

Before you leave, don't forget to order the book here.

---

^[1] Mekuria Bulcha, Ph.D, Oromia’s Irreecha Festival – A Revival of an Ancient African Culture – An Attempt to Understand and Explain, https://www.waaqeffannaa.com/irreechaa/oromias-irreecha-festival-a-revival-of-an-ancient-african-culture-an-attempt-to-understand-and-explain/ (last accessed on 15 January 2025)

^[2] Thea Emilie Forsen (2018), “Down, down Woyane!” A qualitative study of the Qeerroo movement in Ethiopia using Political Process Theory, Norwegian University of Life Sciences

^[3] Hailemariam Desalegn (24 November 2020), Ethiopia’s Government and the TPLF Leadership Are Not Morally Equivalent, https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/11/24/ethiopia-tigray-war-endf-tplf-abiy-ahmed-federal-government-not-morally-equivalent/ (last accessed on 7 March 2025)

^[4] ጃዋር መሐመድ፣ አልፀፀትም (2018)

^[5] ይርጋ አበበ፣ (ጳጉሜ 2፣ 2008)፣ የኦሮሚያ አባ ገዳ ሽማግሌዎች ለጠ/ሚ ኃይለማርያም ያቀረቡት ጥያቄ መልስ አለማግኘቱን ተናገሩ፣ ሰንደቅ ጋዜጣ

^[6] Eagle Eye (3 October 2016), Ethiopia: Down Down Woyane #IrrechaMassacre, https://youtu.be/x8lgL_T88Qg?si=g_ofMLejamzIX89Q (last accessed on 15 January 2025)

^[7] Yeroo Blog (21 November 2016), The Young Man who chanted ”Down Down Wayane escapes persecution, https://yerooblog.wordpress.com/2016/11/21/the-young-man-who-chanted-down-down-wayane-escapes-persecution/ (last accessed on 15 January 2025)

^[8] René Lefort (27 April 2021), Ethiopia’s vicious deadlock, https://www.ethiopia-insight.com/2021/04/27/ethiopias-vicious-deadlock/ (last accessed on 15 January 2025)

^[9] Addis Standard (2016), #IrreechaMassacre: Special Edition in Memory of the Fallen

^[10] Jawar Mohammed (2 October 2016), https://x.com/Jawar_Mohammed/status/782604394021855232 (last accessed on 15 January 2025)

^[11] ትግራይ መቃብር ፀላኢ እያ ፊለጡ (3 October 2016), https://web.facebook.com/watch/?v=1748395982077369&_rdc=1&_rdr# (last accessed on 15 January 2025)

^[12] እስክንድር ፍሬው (3 ኦክቶበር 2016)፣ በቢሸፍቱ በእሬቻ በዓል አከባበር ላይ የሞቱ ሰዎች ቁጥር ማሻቀቡ ተገለፀ፣ https://amharic.voanews.com/a/ethiopia-ireecha2016-oromoprotests-voaamharic/3535225.html (last accessed on 15 January 2025)

^[13] Habtamu Dugo and Joanne Eisen, Irreecha Massacre Was Not a Stampede: Planned and Mechanized Massacre of Hundreds Oromo Civilians in Minutes, https://advocacy4oromia.org/irreechaa/irreecha-massacre-was-not-a-stampede-planned-and-mechanized-massacre-of-hundreds-oromo-civilians-in-minutes/ (last accessed on 15 January 2025)

^[14] Asafa Jalata, The Genocidal Massacre of the Oromos at the Irreechaa Festival: The Lies of the Tigre-led Ethiopian government, https://advocacy4oromia.org/irreechaa/the-genocidal-massacres-of-oromos-at-the-irreechaa-festival-the-lies-of-the-tigre-led-ethiopian-government/ (last accessed on 15 January 2025)

^[15] Briana Duggan (3 October 2016), At least 52 dead in Ethiopia after stampede at Oromo holy festival, https://www.cnn.com/2016/10/03/africa/ethiopia-oromo-deaths/index.html (last accessed on 15 January 2025)

^[16] BBC (3 October 2016), Most Ethiopian injured 'discharged from hospital', https://www.bbc.com/news/live/world-africa-37390803 (last accessed on 15 January 2025)

^[17] ሪፖርተር (5 ኦክቶበር 2016)፣ በኢሬቻ በዓል ላይ በተነሳው ተቃውሞ በርካቶች ሞቱ፣ https://www.ethiopianreporter.com/48756/ (last accessed on 15 January 2025)

^[18] Walta Media, https://waltainfo.com/am/47462/ (last accessed on 15 January 2025)

^[19] ኢብሳ ነመራ (4 ኦክቶበር 2016)፣ የጃዋር ርኩስ መንፈስ፣ https://www.aigaforum.com/amharic-article-2016/Jawars-evil-sprit-10-04-16.pdf (last accessed on 15 January 2025)

^[20] Paul Schemm (14 October 2016), In Ethiopia’s war against social media, the truth is the main casualty, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2016/10/14/in-ethiopias-war-against-social-media-the-truth-is-the-main-casualty/ (last accessed on 15 January 2025)

^[21] HRW(19 September 2017), “Fuel on the Fire”: Security Force Response to the 2016 Irreecha Cultural Festival, https://www.hrw.org/report/2017/09/20/fuel-fire/security-force-response-2016-irreecha-cultural-festival (last accessed on 19 January 2025)

^[22] Addis Standard (2016), #IrreechaaMassacre.

^[23] Jawar Mohammed (2 October 2016), https://www.facebook.com/Jawarmd/posts/pfbid0376MMBfD5QpDoKEJvZmN9XKKKHTExbmWRDtmQDjPaTvNNuQ9YJ94NvuXpRYBY4MTzl (last accessed on 16 January 2025)

^[24] Ministry of Foreign Affairs (3 October 2016), https://x.com/mfaethiopia/status/782951808272662528 (last accessed on 16 January 2025)

^[25] VoA (7 October 2016), Ethiopian Protesters Attack Factories in Africa's Rising Economic Star, https://www.voanews.com/a/ethiopia-protesters-attack-factories-africa-rising-economic-star/3541992.html (last accessed on 16 January 2025)

^[26] Jawar Mohammed (8 October 2016), https://www.facebook.com/Jawarmd/posts/pfbid0BkRuoJU48n8YJUi8VStMGTFc9SbtxEW1RZx59u45h2dTmMrj79p91uEBrLCZDKaHl (last accessed on 16 January 2025)

^[27] Jawar Mohammed (12 October 2016), https://x.com/Jawar_Mohammed/status/786302909310836737 (last accessed on 16 January 2025)

^[28] Human Rights Watch (30 October 2016), Legal Analysis of Ethiopia’s State of Emergency, https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/10/31/legal-analysis-ethiopias-state-emergency (last accessed on 19 January 2025)

^[29] Al Jazeera (13 November 2016), Ethiopia state of emergency arrests top 11,000, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/11/13/ethiopia-state-of-emergency-arrests-top-11000 (accessedon 11 Februrary 2025)

^[30] EHRP (2018), The State of Emergency (2016/2017): Its Cause and Impact.

^[31] Ibid.

^[32] Befekadu Hailu (30 December 2016), Memoirs of my detention at Awash 7: tales of indoctrination, of laughter and the unknown, https://addisstandard.com/memoirs-detention-awash-7-tales-indoctrination-laughter-unknown/ (last accessed on 11 February 2025)