Transforming Ethiopia’s Exclusionary Constitution into an Inclusive One

Before introducing my proposal, I would like to explain my motivation for writing this now.

One of the outcomes of the National Dialogue of Ethiopia scheduled for July is constitutional revision; the National Dialogue Commission will hand over the recommendations "agreed upon" by the participants to the government. Then, the two houses (the House of Peoples' Representatives (HoPR) and the House of Federation (HoF)) are expected to approve the necessary constitutional amendments in a joint session by a two-thirds majority vote (FDRE Constitution 105/3).

In the recent seventh national elections, the Prosperity Party won 438 seats in the HoPR (80% of the total 547), more than 2/3 of the parliamentary seats. Additionally, it won all the regional councils, which represent members of the HoF. Technically, it is in a position to adopt a constitutional amendment that requires approval from 2/3 of the joint meeting of the HoF and the HoPR and from 2/3 of the regional councils. The only exception is Chapter 3 (on Human Rights) of the Constitution (FDRE 105/1/a), which requires majority approval from all regional councils, and it is good that these provisions are strongly protected. And PP seems determined to do it.

In the language of realpolitik, all of Ethiopia's previous constitutions were approved by governments rather than by majority consent. When the current constitution was ratified, although a constitutional drafting assembly drafted it and public discussions were held, it did not include or satisfy all parties, nor did it gain immediate legitimacy or the consent of the majority. However, the source of legitimacy for Ethiopian governments has not been majority legitimacy and consent, but rather total military dominance. When they appear to lose that dominance, the systems they built are pushed out and fall.

Regardless, the constitutions have always added more value to our political system. The FDRE Constitution also protected several rights that should be protected. However, there are certain controversial articles and some that need replacement.

Despite the impression created by proponents of the current constitutional order, constitutions are not holy books; they are subject to revision and amendment. Within 10 years of its ratification, the U.S. Constitution underwent 10 revisions; it has now reached its 27th amendment. The Ethiopian Constitution must also be amended. It would have been ideal if it had been revised through a participatory process that secured majority consent, but that does not seem to be happening.

In any case, whether there is meaningful participation by the public and stakeholders or not, the government seems headed toward amending it. As with the current constitution, which has gained significant legitimacy among certain sections of society over the past 30 years, the upcoming constitutional amendment will inevitably be implemented and will have its share of supporters and critics.

For my part, I have spoken, written, and engaged with the commissioners on every opportunity to highlight that the National Dialogue’s process lacks transparency and inclusivity. In fact, I believe that a "political reconciliation of elites" must precede a national dialogue.

My view was that it would be better for a national dialogue to be led by a commission appointed by, and accountable to, a council established by the politicians involved in political reconciliation. Even though I was given the opportunity to participate in the dialogue, I declined because I believe the process lacks meaningful participation of key stakeholders and popular legitimacy. That, however, doesn’t mean I want the process to go wrong. I always prefer the better evil to win in every negotiation between power and society in Ethiopia. And that is why I write my proposal to promote the ideal of an inclusive constitution.

I was deeply shocked and alarmed by the Commission's list of agenda items for dialogue. I found it a red flag that the three-year agenda-gathering process ended up with the least articulated, vaguest agenda items.

However, as I emphasized above, things will inevitably go the way the government wants. Therefore, I will forward my proposal to whoever may listen.

If you, the participants of the dialogue, come across my ideas and like them, advocate for them. If the rest of you support them, echo them; if you dislike them, challenge me so that we can conduct our own mini-national dialogue.

My wish is that if the Ethiopian Constitution is to be revised, it should be revised in this manner. I want all other articles I haven't commented on to remain as they are, meaning that even if I might want to see them amended, I won't lose sleep over them.

Without further ado, I would like to present my recommendations for an "Inclusive Constitution."

1. Inclusivity over Exclusion

The preamble of the FDRE Constitution does not recognize Ethiopian citizenship and promotes exclusion rather than inclusion. It views all of us as members of ethnic or tribal groups and regards us as having mutually exclusive histories, identities, and interests.

Because of this, it seems as though our existence depends on our ethnicity rather than the other way around. I understand the need to protect some group rights, but there must be a correction and a rewrite to balance individual and group rights. The preamble needs to acknowledge and establish that the relationship among Ethiopia’s nationalities is one of cooperation, not merely competition.

When group rights are granted, the constitution should recognize that citizens possess other group identities beyond ethnic identity, and that deciding which to prioritize should be a matter of citizens’ choice, not the constitution's.

Most importantly, the constitution should have a vision for building an inclusive state and society that welcomes all citizens, grounded in a civilized society (a civil society guided by scientific discoveries) rather than in ethnicity (bloodline and ancestry).

Another issue is nomenclature. Even if the Ethiopian system continues to maintain the current federal arrangement (or not), the name of the states forming the federal government should not be "Region" (Kilil). The word "Region" was adopted from the Soviet Union; it gives the impression of confining an ethnic group to a specific territory, and, when combined with the right to secession, it risks leading the federation to the same fate as the Soviet Union: disintegration.

To remedy this, better terminology must instead be used; my proposal is "Autonomous Administration." The names of the administrations, zones, or districts should never carry an ethnic name. It is preferable that the name be based on geographic direction, a river, or another feature that represents the area, rather than on the name of any ethnic group or community in the area.

Finally, while autonomous administrations or autonomous zones may have a preferred working language, they must not possess an official ethnicity. It is necessary to champion a political philosophy that ensures that anyone with a legal residency ID has equal rights and opportunities within the administration. By doing so, autonomous administrations can be made inclusive of all people.

2. A Semi-Presidential Form of Government

The current parliamentary system encourages an authoritarian political party system. The parliamentary system, even though it does not function effectively in Ethiopia, helps prevent populism. Presidential systems are, on the other hand, more vulnerable to sudden electoral defeats than parliamentary systems, and presidents typically have limited terms of office.

Furthermore, since Ethiopia is a country destabilized by ethnic politics with no single ethnic group comprising more than 50% of the population, a presidential system would require winning over more than one ethnic group, which could dilute ethnic politics even within presidential populism. On top of that, since direct elections would apply to both administrative presidents and city mayors, they would modernize the electoral system from a nominal to a genuine one. However, to avoid losing the benefits of both systems, I suggest introducing a contextualized semi-presidential form of government.

Accordingly, the president who wins the majority of the vote should lead the national defense force and foreign affairs, and nominate the Prime Minister from the party holding the majority of seats in parliament for approval; the president would be accountable to the electorate. The president's term must be limited to two terms. The Prime Minister will have the authority to lead the Federal Police, the security sector, and the bureaucracy, and will be accountable to parliament.

Thus, there will be a dual executive. It would be ideal to have a system in which the winning president takes over the government alongside a running mate. However, if the elected president fails to secure a 50%+1 majority, they must choose the runner-up as their vice president. This ensures a government that holds a real majority consent.

Regarding the separation of powers, the current constitution lacks clarity. Consequently, conflicts over horizontal power and responsibility are observed, on the one hand, between the federal government and the regions. The federal executive holds excessive power, giving it dominance over the legislature and the judiciary. It even interferes with the regions' jurisdictions.

To address this, a presidential form of government allows for the building of government power from the bottom up, increasing voters' influence on local (lower-level) government. The governor of the autonomous administration will not be able to appoint or dismiss city mayors. The city council elected by residents will balance the mayor's power.

3. A Hybrid Electoral System

The current First-Past-the-Post system wastes votes. As long as a candidate wins the majority among competitors, they enter parliament regardless of how small a percentage of the total electorate's votes they received. Because of this, the majority's votes can lose their value.

Conversely, it is necessary to eliminate the method in which a single party sweeps all council seats by using Proportional Representation, in which the votes obtained by political parties within each autonomous administration are counted and distributed proportionally, ensuring that every voter's voice is represented.

However, in a hybrid system, because the president is directly elected, a proportional representation system does not apply to that specific election. Therefore, while the federal president, the presidents of the autonomous administrations, and city mayors are elected via a majoritarian system, council members will be elected through proportional representation. In this way, fully inclusive councils can be established.

4. Restructuring the Federal Arrangement

The current federal system is partitioned along ethnic border lines, with the ultimate goal of gradual separation. The regional states established under the guise of reversing ethnic oppression have themselves created exclusive ethnic homelands, oppressive administrations based on primordial ancestral favoritism.

To prevent this, autonomous administrations must be made inclusive, free of ethnic or religious identities. They should be created and guided by civil ideals rather than by language and bloodline ties, and should possess laws and systems that protect and include minorities living within their administrative borders. For administrative convenience, they should be recreated based on residents' willingness rather than on the pressure of ethnic nationalist turmoil.

The imbalance in size and population among the regions has forced all administrations to seek peace or face conflict, largely depending on the consensus or friction between two specific regions. To remedy this, the sizes of the regions must be balanced.

While regions like Oromia and Amara should be divided into three or four smaller, administratively convenient autonomous administrations, regions like Harari should be merged with neighboring areas to be restructured with a larger population base.

The autonomous administrations must establish a system of government that includes groups in need of protection. When creating autonomous administrations, it may be necessary to limit their populations to between 10 million and 20 million. Given Ethiopia's rapid population growth, the right to request an autonomous administration could be restricted to a local population comprising no less than 7% and no more than 15% of the total national population. It is also not a bad idea for the number of autonomous administrations to grow alongside the population.

Implementing this new federal border restructuring abruptly could ignite major political tensions and conflict on the ground. Therefore, this reorganization process must be guided by a 3-year transition plan approved alongside the constitution.

Over the next three years, the population census, border studies, asset sharing, and the transition of administrative structures must be carried out step by step in a peaceful, gradual, and civilized manner.

To expand the federal government's inclusivity, various institutions can incorporate symbolic representations that blend the cultural and traditional systems of different sections of society with modern elements of government. The autonomous administrations can similarly reflect the traditions of their residents through symbols in their institutions.

5. Promoting Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa into Autonomous Administrative States

Since Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa possess a unique, mixed diversity (diverse settlement), they need to be reestablished as autonomous administrative states that reflect this reality. Administrations should make the primary languages spoken by city residents the languages of work and education, encouraging them to enhance their diversity and serving as models for building an inclusive society. For example, Addis Ababa state can include the current Addis Ababa and Shaggar cities, make its official languages Amharic and Afaan Oromoo, and become a polity with equal autonomy to other autonomous administrative member states of the inclusive federation.

6. Establishing Three Capitals

Concentrating the federal capital in a single location (Addis Ababa) has made the city a center for political controversy and power struggles. Furthermore, it has caused the flow of wealth and infrastructure to tilt in only one direction. To decentralize this hub of power and development and to create shared beneficiaries, the federal government must have three distinct capitals.

Accordingly, within the three newly formed autonomous administrations, the primary seat of the legislature (Parliament) should be in one city, the seat of the executive branch (Government ministries and the diplomatic community) in another, and the judiciary (High courts and the Constitutional Court) in a third city.

This practice will not only distribute infrastructural development and economic activity more evenly across the country but also greatly alleviate the intense political heat and pressure on Addis Ababa.

To allow other areas to develop, it would be beneficial to ensure that the new autonomous administration encompassing Addis Ababa is not one of the three capital cities.

7. Creating a Tripartite Land Ownership System

As land is the primary base of wealth, keeping it solely under government ownership has turned the state into a tool for creating or impoverishing investors at whim. This has allowed the government to become a feudal lord of the land.

Land is a natural resource that all citizens should utilize. Bearing this in mind, to resolve the issue of government landlordism, farmers and urban landowners should be granted ownership of the land itself, not just the properties on it (or the produce). The government should manage areas not held by citizens and possess limited authority over land required for infrastructural development.

Additionally, communal landholding frameworks must be established for urban communities and pastoralists to utilize collectively. By eliminating exclusive state land ownership in this manner, a system can be established in which citizens truly own the spaces and environments they inhabit.

I believe this tripartite land ownership policy is one that EZEMA (Ethiopian Citizens for Social Justice) includes in its policy.

Furthermore, regarding land ownership, the current constitution treats it as ethnic property, which presents an inclusivity problem. A key principle of the Inclusive Constitution is ensuring that no group holds exclusive land ownership rights over any territory.

8. Establishing a Constitutional Court

The judiciary must be separated from the executive branch. However, the fact that constitutional interpretation is handled by the House of Federation poses a major obstacle to the rule of law, which is currently subservient to the executive's political decisions. To prevent this, an independent Constitutional Court must be established to separate and strengthen judicial power. It is better for the judges of the Constitutional Court to be nominated by the president and approved by parliament for terms of up to 10 years, thereby providing them with greater independence.

9. A Three-Language Policy

To achieve greater inclusivity and more realistic implementation, the federal government must enshrine a three-language policy in the Inclusive Constitution. The three-language policy has been implemented in India and has recorded successful outcomes. In Ethiopia, Amharic and Afaan Oromoo, which together account for the vast majority of speakers, will serve as the federal working and educational languages. Autonomous administrations will teach one federal language, their local working language, and English. In this way, it is possible to strengthen national unity, preserve local autonomy, and enhance global competitiveness.

Through a three-language policy, the federal government can achieve a structural nation-building process that includes the majority.